Abstract-The expert advices or consultancies by the expert consultants (ECs) for any critical situation in healthcare are the most important event that occurs on a daily basis in the hospitals. As the success of any critical operation (or surgery) is heavily dependent on ECs, so they can be thought of as one of the crucial elements of the healthcare domain. In many critical situations, there may be a need to hire some ECs from outside of the hospital to provide their expertise to the needy patient(s) that are in-house to the hospital. Earlier this interesting situation of hiring ECs (mainly doctors) from outside of the hospital has been studied under both monetary environment (with infinite budget) and nonmonetary environment (with zero budget). In this paper, a two pass algorithm is proposed for the fixed budget case, for the first time, in healthcare domain. In the first pass it is ensured that a substantial number of ECs must be aware of this hiring concept, so that they can participate in the bidding process and in the second pass, ECs are allocated to a patient satisfying its budget limit and it is interesting to note that the proposed algorithm satisfies truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget feasibility. Through exhaustive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I N the last one decade, crowdsourcing [1] has emerged as an attractive and cost efficient distributed problem solving market. It has captured the significant attention of the research community for its ability in solving problems that requires intelligence and efforts of human beings. In a typical crowdsourcing market, heterogeneous crowd workers (or agents) of undefined size are engaged in accomplishing the task(s) that not only requires human beings effort but also their intelligence. Moreover, in general crowdsourcing environment consists of: the task requester that submits the task(s) to the third party (or in crowdsourcing the third party can be termed as task publisher) that is/are to be accomplished by the heterogeneous crowd workers. Once the task publisher receives the task(s), based on the nature of the task(s) it outsource the task(s) or subtasks to the group of heterogeneous crowd workers in the market. In general, the group of heterogeneous crowd workers that are accomplishing the given tasks are termed as task executers. In order to motivate the large group of task executers, their is a provision of incentivizing the agents once the task(s) is/are completed. It is to be noted V. K. Singh is with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Institute of Technology, Durgapur, WB, 713209 India e-mail: (vikas.1688@gmail.com).
S. Mukhopadhyay is with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Institute of Technology, Durgapur, WB, 713209 India e-mail: (sajmure@gmail.com). that, when these task executers of the crowdsourcing market is inculcated with some smart devices to acquire and share up-todate and fine grained valuable information then it gives rise to a new pragmatic field of study called mobile crowdsourcing or participatory sensing (PS). The key benefits of this new paradigm is that it empowers task executers to collect and share sensed data from their surrounding environment using their smartphones for accomplishing several tasks. In recent years, there emerged a various application areas where the crowdsourcing and PS have been shown to be useful includes: (i) gathering the data about the presence of various toxic materials at agents resident/working environment [2] [3] [4] [5], (ii) a group of common people can provide the information about the condition of the road where they live or through which they travel, (iii) a fit sports person can provide his/her daily groove with the help of multiple sensors embedded in his/her cell phone and few wearable sensors, hoping to make changes in a lifestyle of large community [6] [7] , (iv) deploying the rescuers at the spot where the natural or man-made disaster has taken place after the information is outsourced by the volunteers [8] [9] . Considering the manifold potential application areas of crowdsourcing especially PS, healthcare domain, which is one of the fastest growing domains can adopt the crowdsourcing and PS technologies to make advancement in the available healthcare services. It is observed that, with the prodigious growth of the communication media (say video conferencing, Internet, smartphones etc.), it may be an usual phenomena to hire expert consultants (ECs) especially doctors for the critical operations from outside of the hospitals where the operations will be taking place. This event of hiring an external ECs can be thought of as a special scenario of crowdsourcing [10] [11] and PS [12] [13] . In past, there has been a spate of research work in the direction of efficiently providing the services of these ECs (especially doctors and nurses) under the banner of scheduling of physicians and nurses inside the operating theatre [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . However, one scenario that can be thought of as an interesting and challenging situation in healthcare is, say: during some critical case (say critical operation, etc.) how to get an expert consultancy by the ECs that are not in-house to the hospital in which the patients are admitted. The key challenges that may originate while modelling such situation are: (a) As the ECs may be very busy, how to motivate large group of ECs to take part into the consultancy arena? (b) which ECs are to be given opportunity into such competitive consultancy arena? (c) If some renowned ECs are highly motivated to provide free services for social welfare purpose so that the downtrodden community can be benefited, how to grab such situation? (d) If a patient with the fixed budget is present in the consultancy arena for taking the consultation from outside of the in-house hospital by some ECs, then the questions are: how many ECs can be hired? and what is the amount of incentives that is to be provided to them, so that the total payment made to them are within the patient's fixed budget? Recently, [19] has already made their footstep in the direction of hiring one or more ECs (especially doctors) for a patient from outside of the hospital for a critical operation under infinite budget environment. In [19] the game theoretic solution is provided and the incentives are given to motivate the doctors to participate in the consultancy arena from around the world. By this, they have resolved some of the challenges mentioned in points (a) and (b) above. Moreover, in-order to capture the interesting and challenging situation mentioned in point (c) above, some initial effort is being made in that direction by [20] . In [20] , the set-up consists of multiple hospitals (say n) having several patients and multiple doctors (say m) associated with some reputed hospitals; such that m > n. For simplicity, it is considered that each hospital has a below income group (BIG) patient associated with them that requires an expert consultancy from outside of the hospital. On the other hand, the available doctors give their willingness to participate in the consultancy arena to some third party. The third party selects n doctors out of all the available doctors based on the quality of the doctors. The novelty that is achieved in [20] is that each patient is allocated with the best possible doctor from its revealed preference list. Against the background in [19] [20] , in this paper, to the best of our knowledge, first time we have tried to address the practical situation discussed in point (d) above in a game theoretic settings. In this paper, the set-up consists of a hospital having a patient with some fixed budget B that requires an expert consultancy from outside of the hospital, and their are m number of available ECs in the form of social graph (or social network) that are interested in participating in the consultancy arena as depicted in Fig. 1 . The idea behind considering the social graph representation of ECs is to utilize their professional connections in the healthcare domain. Each node in the social graph is an EC having associated a private information in the form of cost of consultancy and a public information as their quality. Given the professional connections of each EC in the form of social graph along with their cost of consultancy and quality our aim is to select as many ECs as possible (say k) from the available m ECs under the fixed budget B . In this paper, the above discussed scenario is endeavoured under the term Budgeted expert consultant (BECON) hiring problem. More formally, we have modelled the BECON hiring problem as a two fold process. Considering the first fold, the input to the first fold is the professionally connected structure of ECs in the form of social graph G, the information to be influenced (in our case the advertisement about the requirement of the ECs for a patient submitted to the third party T ), the cost vector of the ECs, and the fixed budget B by the hospital. It is to be noted that the fixed budget B provided by the hospital for determining the set of leaders of the social network among the available m ECs that are present in the form of social network is different from the one revealed by the patient i.e. B . The output of the first phase of the BECON hiring problem are: the maximum sized set of ECs that are activated, the set of ECs that acted as the leaders in the social network of ECs, and the payment of each EC that are present in the leader set such that the total payment do not exceeds the budget B. As each EC associates one realistic parameter called its quality but this realistic parameter is not perceived in the first phase of the model. Considering the second phase, the input parameters are the set of activated ECs, the cost vector, and the fixed budget B by the patient. The target of this phase is to hire as many ECs as possible from the available set of activated ECs so that the total payment made to the hired ECs as their consultation fees do not exceeds the budget B . In this phase, the quality of ECs are taken into consideration while hiring activated ECs. In order to show the effect of quality parameter of ECs, it is considered as the valuation of the ECs. In this paper, we have first time proposed a budget feasible auction based solution to the problem of hiring ECs from outside of a hospital for a patient. There exists several papers in the literature [19] [20] that deals with the problem of hiring doctors from outside of the hospital, under monetary and nonmonetary perspective. However, there is no existing work that additionally captures the idea of budget over the total payment made to the ECs. The main contributions of our work are as follows.
• First time we have proposed a framework to study the budget feasible auction for hiring doctors in E-healthcare system.
• Apart from allocating doctors to the corresponding patients under budget feasibility, in this paper a study is also incorporated to drag a large group of doctors into the system for participation by incentivizing the leaders of the social network of the doctors.
• We proposed a Budgeted expert consultant as influencer (BECON-AI) allocation and pricing mechanism for the first phase of BECON hiring problem motivated by [21] that takes into account the professional connections of the ECs in the form of social network of the ECs, the fixed budget by the hospital, and the cost vector of the ECs as their consultancy fees. Our proposed mechanism maximizes the expected number of ECs influenced subject to budget feasibility, truthfulness, and individual rationality. We believe this is the first attempt in designing an approximate truthful mechanism for this interesting class of problem.
• We proposed a Budgeted expert consultant as service provider (BECON-ASP) allocation and pricing mechanism for the second phase of BECON hiring problem motivated by [22] that takes into account the selected set of ECs activated in the first phase of the proposed model, the fixed budget of the patient, and the cost vector of the ECs. Our BECON-ASP mechanism selects the maximum number of ECs under the given fixed budget.
• We establish an upper bound of B (Lemma 1) on the total payment made to the ECs as the leaders of the social network using our proposed BECON-AI allocation and pricing mechanism. Moreover, we have also shown that our BECON-AI mechanism is monotone (Lemma 3). The monotone allocation rule will lead to truthful mechanism (proof is not illustrated due to space constraint). The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II elucidates the preliminary concepts about crowdsourcing, PS, and scheduling in healthcare domain. Section III describes our proposed model. Some required definitions are discussed in Section IV. Section V handles some preliminary concepts required throughout the paper. The proposed mechanisms is illustrated in section VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. RELATED PRIOR WORK
Recently there has been a spate of research at the border of crowdsourcing, PS, and in the direction of one of their application areas i.e. healthcare management. In this section, we discuss the literature on crowdsourcing and PS, taking into account the aspects of incentives, quality of information or data, privacy of the agents, and budget constraints. Along with the crowdsourcing and PS, the literature works in healthcare management is also studied under the banner of scheduling of physicians to the hospital (from inside or from outside of the hospital). There are several other works in healthcare management that considers the scheduling of other sparse resources (especially nurses) from within the hospital.
Crowdsourcing In [28] , fixed price payment scheme is illustrated, providing the fixed price to the winning agents as their payment. Fixed amount based schemes may not be fruitful, if the agents think about the amount of effort they are making for collecting and sending the data. The topic of incentive based schemes has received a huge amount of attention. [13] addresses the incentive scheme under the reverse auction based setting (single buyer and multiple sellers). As the agents participating in the market of crowdsourcing are sagacious (or rational), they will try to maximize their utility by mis-reporting their true value. See [29] [12] [30] for a recent efforts on some incentive schemes. See [31] [30] for remarkable text on the truthful mechanisms for the crowdsourcers. The issue of quality of data collected by the agents was also raised by [31] [32] [33] [34] . In [34] efforts has been made to show the diverse effect of quality of collected data by inculcating the quality of data collected by the agents to their bid values to determine the agent's valuation. Some initial foot steps are taken by [24] [32] [35] [36] to preserve the privacy of the agents so that their private information associated with the data are not leaked. Recently, [11] [37] provides the incentive schemes under the budget constraints. [44] . Little work has been done on the problem of hiring an expert consultant or physicians from outside the hospital. The first paper in this direction [19] , consider the situation that for a critical operation a hospital needs multiple doctors from outside of the hospital for performing the critical operation. The novelty that is introduced in [19] is to develop a game theoretic approach to tackle the situation of hiring a doctor from outside of the hospital. In the series of research in this direction one interesting situation is addressed in [20] that tackle the situation of hiring the doctors from outside of the hospital under zero budget environment.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we formalize the BECON hiring problem where the multiple ECs are hired from outside of the hospital for a patient having fixed budget B ∈ R ≥0 in a hospital. The budget B is a public information. Let us assume that, a set of ECs S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m } are interested in participating in the consultancy campaign, where m is unknown. Each s i ∈ S is associated with a hospital i ∈ H. The set of hospitals for all the m expert consultants is given as H = { 1 , 2 , . . . , m }. The cost vector of all the m doctors is given as: C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m }, where c i ∈ C is the private cost of consultation of s i ∈ S that is not known to the mechanism designer. In this model, there is a single buyer (a patient) and multiple sellers (say expert consultants). This is a perfect setting to model the problem as a reverse auction. In a reverse auction (procurement auction) the hospital authority In general, the quality Q i of an expert consultant i can be estimated using various parameters as shown in table below. Now let us have a closer look on each of the parameters as depicted in Table I , that are playing a crucial role in determining the quality Q i of each EC i ∈ S. Firstly, for determining the qualification parameter for any EC let us suppose that ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω k } be the set of all available courses in the medical sciences. Given the set ω, the qualification of any EC is captured by the qualification function q : 2 ω → R ≥0 . The course vector of all the m available ECs is given as:Ĉ = {ĉ 1 ,ĉ 2 , . . . ,ĉ m }, whereĉ i ∈Ĉ such thatĉ i ⊆ ω represents the set of courses to which the EC s i ∈ S is associated with. So, the value of the qualification parameter for the i th EC is given as q(ĉ i ). It is to be noted that, larger the setĉ i of an EC s i higher will be the q i (ĉ i ) value. Next, we determine the success rate sr i of any EC s i ∈ S. The success rate of the i th EC sr i is given as:
Where,
k } is the set of total number of cases handled by EC s i till date. Here, π i j is the j th case handled by i th EC. The set of cases handled by all the available ECs is given by the vector π = {π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π m }. The numerator of the equation 1 represents the number of medical cases handled successfully by the EC i among the attended set of medical cases and it is captured by the function g : π i → {0, 1}. The experience of any EC is based on the number of such different (or similar) cases handled by him/her. This phenomenon is captured by the function e : π → |π i |. The value of the experience parameter of the i th EC is e(π i ). It is to be noted that larger the set π i greater will be the value e(π i ). Next, the type of organization to which an EC is associated plays a crucial role in determining their quality. The type of organization to which an EC is associated is captured by the function o : S × H → N. Better the organization to which an EC i is associated with, higher will be the value o(s i , i ). So, the quality of the i th EC is given as:
where, the value for all w i ∈ [0, 1]. The weight of each parameter will vary from scenario to scenario. In some cases experience of an EC may be preferred over several other discussed parameters and at some other time success rate of an EC may be preferred. As discussed earlier that our model consists of two phase process. Considering the first phase of our model it is assumed that, each EC i ∈ S is assumed to be professionally connected with some χ i ⊆ S\{s i } that is captured by a social graph G(V, E), where V = {ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 , . . . , ϑ m } is the set of nodes representing the ECs and E is the edge representing their professional connections. Each ϑ i ∈ V associates a cost of consultation c i with them. As the first phase mainly keeps track of number of ECs activated, that is captured by an expert consultant activation function given as I : 2 N → R ≥0 . It means that, given a subset of ECs Γ ⊆ S, the publicly known value I(Γ ) represents the expected number of ECs activated in the given social graph G(V, E) under the given budget B by the subset Γ . It is to be noted that the ECs are rational and strategic in nature. It means that, the ECs can maximize their utility (defined later) by misreporting their private cost. The goal of this phase is to maximize the number of ECs activated by the set of ECs as leaders i.e. Γ under the fixed budget B. The output of the first phase are: the subset of ECs Γ = {s 1 , . . . , s k } such that I(Γ ) = max| ∪ i∈Γ χ i |, the influenced ECsŜ = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s i−1 , s i , . . . , s n }, and the payment vector P Γ = {P Γ1 , P Γ2 , . . . , P Γ k }, where P Γi signifies the payments of i th EC in Γ . The utility of an i th EC selected as as an influencer is defined as:
In the second phase of our proposed model, we have a set of n ECsŜ = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s i−1 , s i , . . . , s n }, and a patient with the fixed budget B in a hospital. The valuation of the ECs is captured by the function D : 2Ŝ → R ≥0 . The valuation function is public information. Our objective is to determine the subsetŜ = max{ξ| i∈ξ c i ≤ B } so that the total payment must satisfy the fixed budget B . A solution is a subset of the ECsŜ ⊆Ŝ and the payment vectorP of the ECs inŜ . More formally, a mechanism M = (A, P), where, A is called an allocation function given as: A : R ≥0 → 2Ŝ and P is called a payment function given as: P : R ≥0 → R ≥0 . The allocation function A maps the set of n cost of consultation to a subsetŜ . The payment function P returns the payment vectorP 1 ,P 2 , . . . ,P |Ŝ | to the ECs. As, the ECs are strategic player in our setting they will try to maximize their utility. The utility of the EC i as service provider is:
IV. REQUIRED DEFINITIONS
This section highlights the definition of the terminologies that will be utilized throughout the paper for understanding purpose.
Definition 1 (Single parameter environment). An environment is said to be a single parameter environment if for each agent i there exists a single tuple as a private information. In our case, each EC s i ∈ S has the cost of consultation c i as the only attribute that is private.
Definition 2 (Monotone allocation rule
). An allocation function A on a single parameter environment is called monotone in c i , if for every agent c −i and every c i ≤ c i we have that
That is, if agent i was winning with c i , then it will still be winning with c i .
Definition 3 (Submodular function).
If Ω is a universal set, a submodular function f : 2 Ω → R, where 2 Ω denotes the power set of Ω, which satisfies the following definition: For any U, V ⊆ Ω with the condition that U ⊆ V and every x ∈ Ω/y, we have:
Definition 4 (Truthful). A mechanism is said to be truthful or incentive compatible (IC) if reporting true cost by any agent i will maximize its utility irrespective of the costs of other agents. Formally in our case, for all i ∈Ŝ the utility relation uŜ i =P i − c i ≥P i − c i = uŜ i holds by considering the fact that uŜ i is the utility of EC i when reporting true cost and uŜ i is the utility of the same EC when reporting other cost c i = c i .
Definition 5 (Individually rational).
A mechanism is said to be individually rational if every agent i results in a non-negative utility. More formally in or case, uŜ i ≥ 0 when participating in the consultancy campaign.
V. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
In this section, we present several well studied concepts in the literature, so as to simplify the further exposition in the paper. We begin with exploring the budget feasible mechanism and later providing the glimpses of influence maximization.
A. Budget feasible mechanism
A budget feasible mechanism is a mechanism in which an allocation rule and payment rule are designed in such a away that the total payment made to winning agents do not exceeds the fixed budget. Considering our case, for the first phase the total payment made to the ECs as an influencers is bounded above by fixed budget B. Mathematically, the system must satisfy the inequality i∈Γ P Γi ≤ B. In his seminal work, Myerson [45] states that, for a single parameter environment when the total payment paid to the winning agents is not restricted by the fixed budget then designing a truthful mechanism is to just design a monotone allocation rule. On the other hand, if this is not the case i.e. the total payment is bounded above by the fixed budget, then establishing a truthful mechanism is intractable.
B. Influence maximization
In the recent years, with the proliferation of online social networks, the flow of any idea or information through vast group of people has become very easy. In past, a spate of research had took place on influence propagation paradigm. This is one of the fundamental problems in the influence market that is studied under the banner of influence maximization. The influence maximization problem has been extensively studied in [46] [47] . In this the goal is to find some set of nodes as initial influencers or adopters such that the expected number of nodes influenced by these initial adopters are maximized. Among others, a motivating example of influence maximization is a viral marketing in social network (e.g. facebook, Orkut etc.), which has become a common arena for business. The seminal work by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [48] illustrates that, given a social graph and an influence function: (it takes a subset of nodes of the graph as input and returns the expected number of nodes influenced in the graph) how to determine the truthful mechanism that maximizes the number of nodes influenced under the fixed budget.
VI. PROPOSED MECHANISMS
In this section, we deal with the several truthful approximation mechanisms for attaining the solution to our proposed system model. To simplify the exposition, we begin with the proposed Budgeted expert consultant as influencer (BECON-AI) mechanism (motivated by [21] 
A. BECON-AI (Influencing mechanism)
In this section, we provide a proposed mechanism BECON-AI consisting of monotone allocation rule and the payment rule for the first phase of our BECON hiring problem. As it is considered that in real life each EC is professionally connected to some other ECs. In our case, this professional connection is captured by a concept called a social graph or social network. Given a social graph G(V, E) and an influence function I : 2 N → R ≥0 , we will follow the coverage model (motivated by [21] ) to determine the number of ECs influenced by the set of ECs as influencers as the possible set of consultants for a particular medical case. Our goal is not to just determine the set of ECs as influencers that can influence the maximum number of ECs but to design a mechanism so that it can select ECs as influencers that yield high coverage means influence large set of ECs, while the incentive compatible payment to the ECs as influencers do not exceed the fixed budget provided given by the hospital.
1) Allocation rule:
The input parameters of the allocation rule of the BECON-AI mechanism (Algorithm 1) are social graph G(V, E), fixed budget by hospital B, and the cost vector C. We call our allocation rule a monotone allocation rule (proof is illustrated in Lemma 4) only when keeping the cost of rest of the ECs i.e. S \ {i} same, an EC i that was selected previously should remain selected when declaring a cost c i such that c i < c i . An EC i is considered as a participant of a consultancy campaign only when the cost of consultation c i is less than the fixed budget B as depicted in line 5-7 of Algorithm 1. Now, each of the EC i ∈ A is ordered based on the marginal contribution per cost. The marginal contribution of an EC i ∈ S is the number of ECs influenced by the the EC i given the set of i − 1 EC i.e. Γ i−1 already selected as influencers. Mathematically, the marginal contribution of i th EC is defined as:
where, Γ i−1 is the set of (i − 1) ECs that are already acted as influencer. Once the ordering is achieved given as: 
14: end while 15: return Γ andŜ 16: end Now, it is stated in line 10 that we will continue to greedily select an EC i ∈ A as an influencer as long as the half of the ratio between the marginal contribution of i given set Γ i−1 and the total number of ECs influenced by the subset of the ECs selected till now including i is greater than or equal to the ratio between the cost of consultation c i of EC i and the total available budget i.e. B. Mathematically,
Later, it will be proved that if some k ECs are selected based on equation 7 and each selected EC is paid according to their proportional contribution, then the total payment do not exceeds the fixed budget B (Lemma 1).
2) Pricing mechanism:
The idea behind determining the payment of each EC i ∈Ŝ is motivated by [49] . In order to determine the payment P Γi of any EC i ∈Ŝ, consider running the Algorithm 2 over the available ECs. The input parameters to the pricing mechanism of the BECON-AI mechansim (Algorithm 2) are the selected set of ECs as influencers Γ , fixed budget by the hospital B, and the cost vector C. Initially, the payment of each EC i ∈ S is set to 0 using line 2 − 4 of the Algorithm 2. Consider running the BECON-AI allocation mechanism (Algorithm 1) for the set of remaining ECs S = S − {s i }. Now, the sorted ordering of the available (m − 1) ECs based on the marginal contribution per cost is given as:
Let us suppose that is the index of the last EC j ∈ S that
. It is to be noted that, by utilizing the marginal contribution of EC i at each point j ∈ [1 . . . + 1], we can determine the maximal cost EC i can declare in order to be considered as influencer instead of the EC at the j th place in ordering. It is given as:
where, M j Ci (Γ j−1 ) is the marginal contribution of EC i at index j and is given as: M j Ci (Γ j−1 ) = I(Γ j−1 ∪ {s i }) − I(Γ j−1 ), where Γ j denotes the subset of the first j ECs in the marginal contribution per cost sorting over the set S .
Algorithm 2 BECON-AI Pricing Mechanism (Γ , B, C)
Output: P Γ ← φ.
1: begin 2: for each i ∈ S do 3:
S ← S \ {i} 7:
S ← S \ {s j } 10:
end while
13:
P Γ ← P Γ ∪ P Γi 14: end for 15: return P Γ 16: end In order to guarantee the truthful property of the BECON-AI mechanism, each winning EC i ∈Ŝ should be paid some threshold value denoted as Π j i . It means that, the EC i should be considered in the winning set of the influencers if its C 
Thus, the unique pricing rule for the available monotone allocation rule is defined as the maximum of the minimum at all the + 1 indices. It is given as:
We will show that for a given BECON-AI allocation mechanism this is the unique pricing rule that results in a truthful BECON-AI mechanism. Observation: As the first phase of our proposed model is based on coverage problem [21] , it captures many of the difficulties that are associated in designing a truthful budget feasible mechanism in that environment. It can be seen that, the marginal contribution of any EC i given the set Γ i−1 i.e. M Ci (Γ i−1 ) is not fixed. It is because of the fact that, the M Ci (Γ i−1 ) of i th EC depends on the subset (Γ i−1 ) of ECs selected as an influencers prior to the selection of i th EC. So, it can be concluded that the ECs position in the sorting plays an important role in determining the marginal contribution of respective ECs. Let us have a closer look to the discussed observation with the help of an example.
Illustrative example: For understanding purpose, let us consider a small social network consisting of some 15 ECs with their professional connections as shown in Fig. 2 . In a given social network of ECs, each EC is capable of influencing itself and several other ECs. Initially no EC is acting as an influencer. Now greedily selecting the initial set of ECs as influencers of the system. Say s 5 in the given social network of the ECs is selected. The node s 5 has professional connections with nodes s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 6 , and s 7 . So, we can say from equation 5 that the marginal contribution of node s 5 is 6 nodes. So, the nodes that are influenced are held in Γ 1 data structure. Next, say s 11 is selected as the initial influencer in the given social network. From the figure below, it can be seen that the node s 11 has professional connections with s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , and s 10 . But the node s 7 has already been influenced by the node s 5 in the previous iteration. So, we can say from equation 5 that node s 11 has s 8 , s 9 , and s 10 node i.e. 3 nodes as the marginal contribution given Γ 1 . Next, in the series of ECs as influencers selection when node s 12 is selected as an initial influencer, following equation 5 the nodes that are influenced are given as s 6 , s 10 , s 13 , s 14 , and s 15 i.e. 5 nodes. But as the nodes s 6 and s 10 are already influenced, the marginal contribution of node s 12 given the selected set Γ 2 = {s 5 , s 11 } will be the nodes s 13 , s 14 , and s 15 i.e. 3 nodes. Now let's have a closer look on the paradox that, if in the sequence of selection of influencing ECs if say node s 12 would have been selected prior to the selection of node s 5 , and s 11 , in this case the nodes that are influenced by the node s 12 given the nodes that are already influenced i.e. φ will be s 6 , s 10 , s 13 , s 14 , and s 15 . From equation 5 it is clear that the node s 12 in this case will influence 5 nodes. Similarly the nodes s 11 , and s 5 in this order. So, it can be concluded from the above example that the position at which the node in the sequence is selected will matter. Lemma 1. Given a fixed budget B and the bid profile vector C of the EC set S; the claim is, the total payment made to the selected set of ECsŜ as influencers will not exceed the fixed budget B.
Proof. The proof is motivated by [21] . As always, designing a direct revelation DSIC mechanism is tricky because the allocation rule and payment rule need to be coupled carefully when the payment of the mechanism is restricted by fixed budget. The basis of the proof lies in the idea of stopping condition used in the allocation rule of the mechanism that is utilized to determine the number of ECs considered as influencers. The first step in determining the optimal number of ECs as an influencer under the fixed budget constraint B is to sort each EC s i ∈Ŝ according to the marginal contribution per cost i.e. M Ci (Γ i−1 )/c i . Next, not all the ECs inŜ are considered for providing the consultancy, only those ECs fromŜ is considered for consultancy that satisfies
stopping condition in the allocation rule of the mechanism. The second step is to define a payment rule that, when coupled with the above allocation rule, yields a DSIC mechanism. Since, the payment is the maximum over all min{C i then only the mechanism will consider that EC as an influencer. As this is always true because of the stopping condition used in the allocation rule. So, it can be said that the maximum payment that any winning EC i can be paid is
I(Γi−1∪{i}) . If say each of the winning EC is paid i ∈Ŝ i.e. maximal, then the total payment of the ECs as an influencers i.e. T P I is given as:
Influenced ECs by set Γi
Influenced ECs by set Γi−1
Hence, it is proved that the incentive compatible total payment do not exceed the budget.
Lemma 2. If any EC s i ∈ S comes ahead of its current position say i < i by declaring a cost c i < c i then,
Proof. If the EC i by reporting c i moves at position i such that i < i as depicted in Fig. 3 then from the definition of I we can say:
As the set Γ i −1 is smaller as compared to the set Γ i−1 , so from the definition of the monotone submodular marginal contribution property, it can be said:
The number of ECs influenced by the set Γ i will be less than the number of ECs influenced by Γ i . Mathematically,
Marginal contribution of i given Γi−1
Combining equation 17 and equation 18, we get
Multiplying both side by B 2 , we get:
Hence, it is proved. Lemma 3. The proposed mechanism M(A, P) is monotone.
Proof. Fix i, c −i , c i , and c i . For mechanism M(A, P) to be monotone, we need to show that, any winning EC i with private cost c i will still be considered in the winning set of ECs when declaring c i such that c i < c i or any losing EC i with private cost c i will still be considered in the losing set of ECs when declaring c i such that c i > c i . The proof is divided into two cases. Case 1. In this case, the i th winning EC deviates and reveals a cost of consultation c i < c i . Again two cases can happen. If the EC i shows a small deviation in his/her (henceforth his) cost c i i.e. c i such that c i < c i and the current position of the EC i remains unchanged. In this situation, it can still be considered in the winning set. It is to be noted that, if the EC i reports a large deviation in his cost c i i.e. c i such that c i < c i , then in this case by definition:
c n EC i will be placed some position ahead (say i ) of its current position say i i.e. i < i. This scenario is depicted in Fig. 4 below. From Lemma 2 it can be said that if EC i is placed some position ahead by revealing a cost c i < c i then it must satisfy
Given the inequality in equation 19, let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, when the EC i ∈ S comes ahead in ordering say at some position i such that c i < c i , then it is not considered in the winning set of the EC because it is not satisfying the given budget. If this is the case, then it means that:
Combining our assumption c i < c i and equation 21 it can be concluded that:
Using equation 7 and equation 21, we can say that:
So, it is a contradiction.
Case 2. In this case, the i th losing EC deviates and reveals a cost of consultation c i > c i . Again two cases can happen. If the EC i shows a small deviation in his/her (henceforth his) cost c i i.e. c i such that c i > c i and the current position of the EC i remains unchanged. In this situation, it will be considered in the losing set. It is to be noted that, if the EC i reports a large deviation in his cost c i i.e. c i such that c i > c i , then in this case by definition:
c n EC i will be placed some position ahead (say i ) of its current position say i i.e. i > i. This scenario is depicted in Fig. 4 below. Analogous to the statement given in Lemma 3 it can be said that if EC i is placed some position ahead by revealing a cost c i > c i then it must satisfy
Given the inequality in equation 19, let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, when the EC i ∈ S comes ahead in ordering say at some position i such that c i > c i , then it is not considered in the losing set of the EC because it is satisfying the given budget. If this is the case, then it means that:
Combining our assumption c i > c i and equation 21 it can be concluded that:
Hence, the lemma is proved.
Lemma 4. The proposed mechanism M(A, P) is truthful.
Proof. Fix EC j, c −j , c j , and c j . For mechanism M(A, P) to be truthful, we need to show that, it is not beneficial for any EC j to underbid or overbid say c j such that c j < c j or c j > c j respectively. For each of the above possible scenarios, the proof is divided into two cases. Before going into the different cases let's consider the case where the EC j is reporting his true cost c j . The pictorial representation of the possible set-up with n ECs are shown in Fig. 6 . The values from 1 to n represents the position (or index). Currently, our analysis lies around the index k and k+1; where k denote the index of the last EC that respects the allocation condition given in equation 7. As the ECs are sorted based on the marginal contribution per cost, so we can write
By using equation 9 and equation 20 it can be easily seen that, c j ≥ C 
If this is the case, then it can be concluded that C i j ≤ c j or Π i j ≤ c j . As the payment is less than the actual cost. Hence not allocated. Now, coming back to our underbid and overbid scenarios.
In this case, the j th EC deviates and reveals a cost of consultation c j < c j . This scenario gives rise to two cases. Case 1. When EC j is in losing set. If the EC j shows a small deviation in his/her (henceforth his) cost i.e. c j such that c j < c j and the current position of the EC j remains unchanged. In this situation, it can still be considered in the losing set. It is to be noted that, if the EC j reports a large deviation in his cost c j i.e. c j in this case it will belong to winning set and will appear before EC i as shown in Fig. 7 .
(with EC j, reporting truthfully) (with EC j, misreporting)
(without EC j ) As the ECs are sorted based on the marginal contribution per cost, so we can write:
and c j ≤ Case 2. When EC j is in winning set. If the EC j shows a deviation in his cost such that c j < c j it will still belong to winning set and will appear before EC i as shown in Fig. 8 . As the ECs are sorted based on the marginal contribution per cost, so we can write:
B. BECON-ASP (Hiring mechanism)
This section deals with the proposed mechanism BECON-ASP consisting of the monotone allocation rule and the pricing mechanism for the second phase of our BECON hiring problem. Our proposed BECON-ASP mechanism utilizes the influenced set of ECs i.e. S of the first phase, the fixed budget B by the patient, and the cost vector C. Using BECON-ASP mechanism, our goal is to hire as many ECs as possible among the available n ECs under the given fixed budget B . As the second phase of our model consists of multiple sellers (as ECs) and a single buyer (as a patient); this is the perfect setting to model this phase of BECON hiring problem in the reverse auction framework but with the constraint of patient having fixed budget B . It is to be noted that, each EC i ∈Ŝ is associated with private cost c i ∈ R ≥0 as his/her cost of consultancy. On the other side, a patient have a publicly known fixed budget B and the demand valuation function D : 2 n → R ≥0 . In this environment, our target is not just to determine the setŜ such thatŜ ∈ max{2Ŝ | i∈2Ŝ P i ≤ B } but also the incentive compatible pricing mechanism for the winning ECs, so that the total payment made to the hired ECs do not exceeds the fixed budget B provided by the patient.
1) Allocation rule:
The input parameters of the allocation rule of BECON-ASP mechanism (Algorithm 3) are the set of ECsŜ, fixed budget B , and the cost vector C. The output is the set of expert consultantŜ hired under fixed budget constraint B . So, the first step in the BECON-ASP allocation mechanism is to sort each of the EC i ∈Ŝ based on their respective marginal contribution per cost. The marginal contribution of an EC i ∈Ŝ given a subset Υ i−1 of an ECs already selected is:
It is to be noted that D(Υ t ) = i≤t Q i for all t, where Υ t = {1, 2, . . . , t}.
Algorithm 3 BECON-ASP Allocation Mechanism (Ŝ, B , C)
Output:Ŝ ← φ. i ← i + 1 8: end while 9: returnŜ 10: end It is assumed that D(Υ 0 ) = φ. Dissimilar to the first phase, it can be seen that, the marginal contribution of each EC is independent of their position in the sorted ordering. Thus, the ordering over the available n ECs in the setŜ based on their marginal contribution per cost is given as:
c n (21) Next, it is stated in the line 4 of the Algorithm 3 that an EC with the highest marginal contribution per cost will be selected as a possible EC to serve a patient. From line 5 − 8, it is seen that Algorithm 3 continues to greedily selects an EC from the sorted ordering of ECsŜ as a service provider as long as the ratio between the respective cost of consultation an the fixed budget B is less than or equal to the ratio between their respective marginal contribution and the sum of the marginal contribution of the total number of ECs selected till now including the currently selected EC i. Mathematically,
Finally, the allocation rule of BECON-ASP returns the maximal set of ECsŜ = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k } that are hired for serving a patient under the fixed budget B .
2) Pricing mechanism: The pricing mechanism for the hired ECs in the second phase of our proposed model is motivated by [49] . In order to determine the paymentP i of any EC i ∈Ŝ consider running the Algorithm 4 over the set S . Initially, the payment of each EC i ∈Ŝ is set to 0 using line 2 − 4 of the Algorithm 4. The input parameters to the BECON-ASP pricing mechanism (Algorithm 4) are the set of ECsŜ , fixed budget B , and the cost vector C. Here, the payment of any EC i ∈Ŝ is upper bounded by Di(Υi−1)·B i∈S D(Υi) . It means that, the calculated payment for each EC i ∈Ŝ i.e.P i will not exceeds the EC i s proportional share i.e.
Di(Υi−1)·B i∈S D(Υi) . So, the overall payment of any EC i ∈Ŝ is captured by:
From equation 22 it is assured that the payment of any EC i ∈Ŝ will not exceed the declared cost of consultancy c i . Hence, the proposed BECON-ASP mechanism is individually rational (proved in Lemma 5). Proof. To prove that the function is indeed monotone, let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, if S ⊆ F then D(S) > D(F). More formally, following equation 13, the above inequality can be elaborated as: D(S) > D(F)= i∈S Q i > i∈F Q i . It is to be noted that under the given condition S ⊆ F, the sum of all the Q i s over the set T will be greater than the sum of all the Q i s over the set S i.e. i∈S Q i ≤ i∈T Q i . So, the inequality D(S) > D(F) = i∈S Q i > i∈F Q i cannot be true. Our assumption contradicts. Hence, the inequality if S ⊆ F then D(S) ≤ D(F) holds and the given function is monotone.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we endeavoured to address the problem of hiring the ECs, who are willing to provide their expertise during the critical healthcare situation under the budget constraint. Our proposed BECON hiring problem is studied as a two phase process. In the first phase, the efforts are being made to inform as many ECs as possible in the fixed budget environment using the concept called influence maximization. Furthermore, in the second phase the n influenced ECs participates in the healthcare consultancy arena as a possible ECs to be hired. This paper introduces an approximate truthful mechanisms: BECON-AI for tackling the situation of the first phase of the problem and BECON-ASP for hiring as many ECs as possible from the available n ECs under fixed budget. With an exhaustive experiments, we will evaluate our proposed mechanisms BECON-AI and BECON-ASP (simulation under progress). This work offers a first step in modelling the problem of hiring ECs in a budget constraint environment, that is leading to open up many challenging directions. Designing a more general mechanism for the set-up consisting of multiple patients say n (each patient is associated to different hospitals) and m ECs can be thought of as the immediate future work.
